Exploring the ecological outcomes of mandatory Biodiversity Net Gain using evidence from early-adopter jurisdictions in England by zu Ermgassen, Sophus O.S.E. et al.
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
zu Ermgassen, Sophus O.S.E., Marsh, Sally, Ryland, Kate, Church, Edward, Marsh, Richard
and Bull, Joseph   (2021) Exploring the ecological outcomes of mandatory Biodiversity Net Gain
using evidence from early-adopter jurisdictions in England.   Conservation Letters .    ISSN 1755-263X.
   (In press)
DOI




Exploring the ecological outcomes of mandatory Biodiversity Net Gain using 
evidence from early-adopter jurisdictions in England 
 
Sophus O.S.E. zu Ermgassen1*, Sally Marsh1,2, Kate Ryland3, Edward Church4, Richard Marsh5, Joseph 
W. Bull1 
1 Durrell Institute of Conservation and Ecology, School of Anthropology and Conservation, University 
of Kent, Canterbury. sz251@kent.ac.uk; j.w.bull@kent.ac.uk; s.marsh@highweald.org 
2 High Weald AONB Partnership, Flimwell, East Sussex. s.marsh@highweald.org 
3 Dolphin Ecological Surveys, Edgedown, Kammond Avenue, Seaford, East Sussex BN25 3JL. 
kate@ecodolphin.co.uk 
4 Department of Planning, South Oxfordshire and Vale of White Horse District Councils. 
edward.church@southandvale.gov.uk 
5 Leeds City Council, Strategic Planning, Environment & Design Group, Merrion House, 110 Merrion 




Net outcome-type biodiversity policies are proliferating globally as perceived mechanisms to 
reconcile economic development and conservation objectives. The UK government’s Environment 
Bill will mandate that most new developments in England demonstrate they deliver a biodiversity 
net gain (BNG) to receive planning permission, representing the most wide-ranging net outcome-
type policy globally. However, as with many nascent net-outcome policies, the likely outcomes of 
mandatory BNG have not been explored empirically. We assemble all BNG assessments (accounting 
for ~6% of England’s annual housebuilding and other infrastructure) submitted from January 2020-
February 2021 in six early-adopter councils who are implementing mandatory No Net Loss or BNG 
requirements in advance of the national adoption of mandatory BNG, and analyse the aggregate 
habitat changes proposed. Our sample is associated with a 34% reduction in the area of non-urban 
habitats, generally compensated by commitments to deliver smaller areas of higher-quality habitats 
years later in the development project cycle. Ninety-five percent of biodiversity units delivered in 
our sample come from habitats within or adjacent to the development footprint managed by the 
developers. However, we find that these gains fall within a governance gap whereby they risk being 
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impact evaluation, impact mitigation, market-based instruments, nature conservation, biodiversity 
net gain, no net loss 
  
The challenge of reconciling biodiversity conservation with infrastructure expansion 
Under the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the global community has simultaneously 
committed to rapidly expanding built infrastructure networks (SDG 9), whilst ending biodiversity loss 
(SDGs 14 and 15). However, historically the unmitigated impacts of infrastructure have been a 
dominant driver of biodiversity loss, threatening one-third of IUCN Red List species 
(https://www.iucnredlist.org/). To reconcile the SDGs, fundamentally new approaches to 
infrastructure implementation are required (Thacker et al., 2019). A particular class of policies 
emerging globally to address this focus on achieving No Net Loss (NNL) or Net Positive biodiversity 
outcomes from new developments (Bull et al., 2020; Bull and Strange, 2018; Milner-Gulland et al., 
2021). These are predicated on the concept that infrastructure and biodiversity conservation can 
theoretically go hand-in-hand if infrastructure is planned to avoid and minimise impacts, and 
residual impacts are compensated for through conservation actions. There is a wide variation in 
these policies’ effectiveness (zu Ermgassen et al., 2019a), with limited systematic understanding of 
when they work or fail. The most wide-ranging of these policies globally is the proposal, outlined in 
the UK Government’s Environment Bill, for development under the Town and Country Planning Act 
(i.e. nearly all residential, commercial and mining construction) in England to deliver a mandatory 
Net Gain in biodiversity (although this notably does not cover ‘Nationally Significant Infrastructure’ 
(Defra, 2019a)). The Environment Bill is expected to be ratified in 2021, with the mandatory 
requirement for Biodiversity Net Gain (BNG) implemented after a two-year transition period. 
Like many densely-populated wealthy nations, England faces interlocking socio-ecological policy 
challenges: it is ecologically impoverished, with ongoing wildlife declines (State of Nature 
Partnership, 2019). However, it has committed to building 300,000 new homes annually by the mid-
2020s (Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, 2018), and has promised heavy 
investments in new infrastructure through its post-Coronavirus recovery strategy (HM Treasury, 
2020). Mandatory BNG might partially reconcile these challenges (Defra, 2018, p4), and is globally 
relevant in the context of finding policy solutions to mitigate the environmental impacts of the 
global infrastructure boom (zu Ermgassen et al., 2019b). 
  
Implementation of the mandatory Biodiversity Net Gain requirement 
Developers in England will have to demonstrate their proposals achieve a net gain in biodiversity 
(measured using a government-prescribed biodiversity metric) to receive planning permission from 
local planning authorities (LPAs), who ultimately assess all of the development plans associated with 
the site (which can include various economic, social and environmental impact assessments, 
construction plans, feasibility studies etc.) and decide whether projects have the right to proceed. 
Currently, BNG assessments align with the ecological impact assessment (EcIA) process, taking 
information routinely collected during pre-development ecological surveys and feeding this through 
an Excel-based biodiversity calculator tool, the “Biodiversity Metric 2.0” (Crosher et al., 2019; 
Treweek et al., 2010). The Metric is a multiplicative composite indicator converting inputs including 
the area, habitat condition, habitat distinctiveness, and various multipliers (capturing elements 
including the risk of project failure, the expected time taken for the proposed habitat to reach its 
desired condition level, and the landscape-scale ecological importance of the site) for each habitat 
patch within the development footprint into an overall biodiversity score measured in ‘biodiversity 
units’ (supporting information). The data required from the project site include quantitative data 
(the area of each habitat patch within the development site and in the proposed post-development 
plan), qualitative judgements from ecological consultants regarding the habitats’ condition and 
classification, and some landscape-scale information such as whether the project site lies within an 
area of landscape-scale importance to biodiversity. These data gathered at the project site are 
integrated in the Metric with other ecological information which is pre-set for each habitat type and 
condition level based on expert judgement (e.g. each habitat is given a pre-set distinctiveness score 
within the Metric; pre-set values capture how long it takes for a given habitat to reach a given 
condition level under ecological management measures). It calculates the number of baseline 
biodiversity units within the development footprint plus (where applicable) associated 
compensation areas owned/managed by the developer, and compares this with predicted post-
development biodiversity units. The Metric also provides guidance on whether like-for-like trades 
should be required for the specific habitat types included in the assessment (e.g. for high 
distinctiveness habitats), or whether other trading rules are permitted (e.g. for low distinctiveness 
habitats). The mandatory BNG-requirement necessitates the overall post-development biodiversity 
score is ≥10% higher than the baseline. If not, the developer must either alter their project plan 
appropriately or deliver the unit shortfall by offsetting through a payment to the council or a third 
party (e.g. habitat bank) which is then liable for delivering biodiversity gains elsewhere. If no 
compensation sites are available within the LPA where the development is planned, then 
compensation is permitted in other local authorities; but this triggers a spatial multiplier within the 
Metric which increases the compensatory units required. As a last resort, developers will be able to 
purchase biodiversity credits from the national government. 
The mandatory BNG requirement is expected to deliver conservation benefits by providing a 
punitive-tax-like disincentive from harming biodiversity initially: developers will incur costs if their 
project inflicts damage on habitats (‘internalising the externalities’; zu Ermgassen et al., 2020). 
Additionally, where developers are unable to meet biodiversity obligations themselves, the 
requirement to purchase ‘biodiversity units’ is viewed as an opportunity to stimulate private sector 
investment in nature regeneration. There are widespread hopes that this will create a market in 
‘biodiversity units’, attracting private landholders into for-profit biodiversity unit generation (Defra, 
2019b). 
However, the potential impacts of the mandatory BNG requirement have not been empirically 
evaluated. We collected all the BNG assessments accompanying planning applications submitted 
from January 2020-February 2021 (the Metric was essentially finalised in December 2019) in six 
councils who have adopted BNG-equivalent policies in advance of its national rollout (supporting 
information; Table S1) into a new database. BNG assessments tend to be provided either as chapters 
within the proposed project’s preliminary ecological appraisal, EcIA, or as standalone documents, 
and they contain as a minimum copies of the outputs of the Biodiversity Metric Excel tool (at best, 
they contain habitat plans and descriptions for the site at baseline and post-development). We 
identified appropriate councils via engagement with representatives from Defra, councils, and 
industry associations. The database is live, with more councils added when identified. In total, 16 
potential councils were identified; but only the six councils included in our database have BNG-
equivalent policies (Figure 1). We define these as BNG-equivalent as they all ask applicants to submit 
BNG assessments utilising the Metric alongside other planning information, and mandate that a net 
outcome-type target is achieved for each project (either NNL or 10% net gain) like the proposed 
national policy. We identified 90 projects referencing BNG assessments, of which 55 provided 
sufficient information for inclusion. We then removed one outlier project (a dwelling overseeing a 
30ha estate implementing landscape-scale ecological restoration) as it was evidently not a policy-
driven outcome, and six applications which were rejected by the planning authorities. Our sample 
spans 1000.3ha of development footprint, of which created or enhanced compensatory non-urban 
habitats comprise 468ha. The previous best academic estimate of England’s entire implemented 
offset area was 53ha (Bull and Strange, 2018), demonstrating the upscaling of ecological 
compensation represented by the mandatory requirement. By comparing the baseline and proposed 
future biodiversity assessments for developments in our sample, we explore which land cover 
changes are likely to be driven by BNG, what role off-site biodiversity offsetting will play, and their 




Figure 1. Summary of the BNG dataset, including the development types and locations and details of 
the six councils’ BNG-equivalent policies.  
 
 
Early signs that the biodiversity unit market may be smaller than expected 
A first finding is that demand for biodiversity units delivered through offset funds or the biodiversity 
unit market in our sample is low (4.5% of total units); 95% of biodiversity units are to be delivered 
through the creation and enhancement of habitats within the development footprint or adjacent 
developer-owned compensation areas. This contrasts with the government’s Net Gain impact 
assessment, which used a central estimate (based on anecdotal responses to the government’s Net 
Gain consultation) for units purchased off-site of 25% (although they model scenarios including 0%; 
Defra, 2019b). The government has highlighted that developers paying for the off-site delivery of 
biodiversity units could be an important source of funding for investments within the Local Nature 
Recovery networks for each LPA (Defra, 2018, p9). The funding provided by these off-site payments 
might either be collected by the LPAs themselves and invested in a portfolio of biodiversity projects 
(e.g. enhancement of council-owned land; purchase of private land and its addition to the council’s 
conservation estate) selected by the LPA, or collected by private brokers and invested in habitat 
banks. Our preliminary results raise doubts about the size of the biodiversity unit market. However, 
only five of our LPAs provide offsetting options, and the habitat creation market is still immature, so 
the desirability of purchasing biodiversity units may rise over time. 
The number of purchased biodiversity units is low in our sample because 95% of the proposed 
biodiversity units will be delivered on land owned/managed by the developers. Ninety-one percent 
of units will be delivered via habitats within the direct development footprints (e.g. recreational 
grassland areas, tree and scrub establishment along hedgerows and site margins, some projects 
have dedicated ecological enhancement zones). Whilst small habitat patches within built 
environments can have ecological value, they are also threatened by high levels of human pressure. 
For example, 49% of the biodiversity units generated within residential developments in our sample 
come from on-site grasslands and scrub habitats, representing 27% of the total biodiversity units 
delivered in the dataset. 
 
Biodiversity Net Gain will trade losses in habitat area today for promises of future gains in 
habitat quality 
The dataset reveals a 34% reduction in the total area of open greenspace (defined as all non-urban 
habitats included within the Metric and excluding the units from as-yet-unspent offset funds), 
despite promising a 20.5% increase in biodiversity units across our sample. These losses in habitat 
area will be traded for habitats of higher distinctiveness and condition in the future (Figure 2). The 
pattern of change in habitats in our sample is consistent with a policy of ‘trading up’, with less 
distinctive habitats replaced by more distinctive habitats or higher condition levels. The true 
biodiversity impact of these trends is unclear. Intuitively, the loss of 34% of non-urban habitat area is 
likely to lead to a reduction of real-world biodiversity. However, improvements to the quality of 
habitats which increase the ecological resources available to wildlife relative to the baseline state 
could counteract this. The relative strength of these two factors should be further explored through 
field-validation of the Metric. 
 
 
Figure 2. Aggregate ecological changes proposed in our sample of Biodiversity Net Gain assessments, 
by habitat type and habitat condition. Categories represent all of the relevant habitat types included 
in the Metric grouped together (e.g. ‘scrub’ contains the sum of ‘mixed scrub’, ‘bramble scrub’ and 
other related habitats included in the Metric), whilst ‘modified grassland’, and ‘other neutral 
grassland’ each represent a single habitat category in the Metric. A) total area devoted to different 
habitat types under the baseline (blue), and post-development scenario (yellow/brown). B) total 
number of biodiversity units delivered under the baseline (blue), and post-development scenario 
(yellow/brown). Annotations highlight key patterns in the dataset. 
 
 
Our dataset demonstrates that mandatory BNG will trade biodiversity losses today for uncertain 
future gains, yielding a classic problem in the offsetting literature (Maron et al., 2012). It is widely 
recognised that compensating for losses today with promises of future biodiversity gains is risky 
(acknowledged in the Metric through restoration difficulty and temporal risk multipliers) as 
compensation measures are subject to implementation and restoration failure, and future political 
reversals (Bezombes et al., 2019; Maron et al., 2012; zu Ermgassen et al., 2019a). Therefore, 
conservationists typically prefer for compensation measures to be successfully implemented before 
associated biodiversity losses. These pre-development gains are commonly delivered through 
habitat banks. However, when these proposed gains are delivered on-site, they cannot usually be 
secured in advance of development; here it is essential that appropriate governance exists to ensure 
promises of future habitat improvements are delivered (discussed below; Damiens et al. 2021). This 
requires that proposed future gains are ecologically realistic and that modelling of gains is unbiased, 
so if the specified ecological measures are actually implemented, these gains are likely to be 
achieved in reality. Secondly, it relies on the appropriate governance being in place for incentivising 
and regulating real-world implementation. 
 
How robust and open to bias are habitat condition assessments? 
Like many EcIA processes, the Metric requires inputs based on subjective judgements of ecological 
consultants (although BNG guidance documents underpin these with some objective criteria to 
guide judgements). The Metric is most sensitive to the identification of habitat type (using the UK 
Habitats Classification system (https://ukhab.org/)), which determines the ‘distinctiveness’ score for 
each habitat, and its condition score. If there is substantial scope for error or bias in the Metric, then 
the number of units reportedly delivered through the BNG assessment process might be a poor 
reflection of their true ecological value. For example, under the baseline we find 342ha of modified 
grassland, a ‘low distinctiveness’ habitat (distinctiveness multiplier=2). If that same grassland were 
classified as ‘other neutral grassland’ (‘medium distinctiveness’, multiplier=4), all else equal, it would 
require compensation by double the area of post-development habitats. This highlights the 
importance of EcIAs (and BNG assessments) being undertaken by suitably-trained professionals, and 
subject to rigorous assessment by regulators. Leaving such an influential scope for judgements 
comes with risks, especially if ecological consultants lack sufficient training to conduct the relevant 
specialised ecological assessments (e.g. grassland assessments), or are implicitly pressurised to 
report a reduced biodiversity unit obligation by clients (Carver and Sullivan, 2017). 
To investigate whether the Metric is open to judgement-based variability, we surveyed seven expert 
grassland ecologists (supporting information). We provided them with all the publicly-available 
grassland survey information used in the baseline calculation associated with a sample of five BNG 
assessments (N=13 grassland patches), chosen to represent a range of survey qualities (supporting 
information). We removed the final condition scores and habitat type classifications, and asked 
experts to propose the correct grassland type and condition score, given the information provided. 
Our specialised expert sample (which required expertise with a new condition assessment process 
and two habitat classification systems) is too small for statistical inference, but is indicative of 
whether experts broadly agree with judgements in BNG reports. Our expert sample agreed with 
both the habitat type and condition assessments 31% of the time, habitat type alone 42%, and 
condition alone 64% of the time. There was not universal agreement amongst experts regarding the 
grassland type for any grasslands in our survey (supporting information), which indicates that less-
specialised planners critiquing BNG assessments may find the habitat type and condition 
assessments challenging to scrutinise. Our survey findings indicate that boundaries between habitat 
categories are open to interpretation, and that the quality of information provided in BNG 
assessments is often insufficient to properly scrutinise. 
 
Major governance gaps risk jeopardising the outcomes of Biodiversity Net Gain 
To assess whether appropriate governance is in place to ensure the delivery of promised biodiversity 
units (a complex challenge that is often unrecognised (Damiens et al. 2021)), we reviewed the 
governance mechanisms proposed in all BNG-related government, parliamentary and industry 
documentation, highlighting the key points relating to skills, capacity building, monitoring, 
enforcement, financial arrangements, and legal arrangements (supporting information; Table S4). 
The key finding is that, although there are ambitious commitments to monitoring and implementing 
offsetting measures delivered into the biodiversity unit market and via the government’s stream of 
‘statutory’ biodiversity credits, little attention has been paid to ensuring the delivery of habitats 
within developer-owned land. Nearly all additional governance mechanisms proposed are aimed at 
securing 4.5% of the biodiversity delivered through mandatory BNG (although this may rise on 
implementation of national mandatory BNG). Experience from NNL-type policies around the world 
shows that governance and implementation issues are essential drivers of their outcomes – often 
more important than policy-design parameters (Evans, 2017; Quétier et al., 2014; Samuel, 2020).   
The UK government has committed to resourcing mandatory BNG implementation and developing 
appropriate industry and regulator skills and capacity, which if implemented may address key 
problems highlighted in other NNL-type contexts (Quétier et al., 2014; Samuel, 2020). The 
government has committed to resourcing an additional 1.3 full-time-equivalent (FTE) employees for 
every higher-tier LPA in England (the largest spatial unit of local government, with 152 across 
England) to implement mandatory BNG (Defra, 2019b; although these commitments were made 
prior to the Covid-19 recession which has renewed the government’s narrative regarding the need 
for fiscal prudence).This represents a large increase in capacity given approximately three-quarters 
of English LPAs currently have no in-house ecological expertise (ENDS report, 2019). However, 
planning policy is often delivered by lower-tier authorities (25 of the higher-tier authorities across 
England covering >50% of England’s land area are comprised of 188 ‘lower tier’ authorities), and we 
found no formal commitments to increase their resourcing. There are concerns that most councils 
currently lack the ecological expertise to evaluate net gain assessments (Knight-Lenihan, 2020). If 
unaddressed, this might lead to councils ‘accepting’ BNG assessments which are ecologically 
unrealistic (i.e. overpromise on biodiversity units). Additionally, the government commits to 
resourcing 59 FTE employees across Defra and Natural England to facilitate BNG implementation, 
focussing on the delivery and monitoring of off-site biodiversity units and local nature recovery 
networks. The Environment Bill also lays down a policy framework for the delivery of off-site 
biodiversity units (Table S4). 
However, the documentation reveals a gap with regards to biodiversity units delivered within 
developers’ land. It suggests that existing planning enforcement without modifications is sufficient 
to secure developer-managed biodiversity delivery, although ‘significant’ on-site biodiversity gains 
will need to be secured through a ‘suitable mechanism’ (Defra, 2020, p179), which although not yet 
formalised could mean by conservation covenant or section 106 agreement. Given that 95% of 
biodiversity units in our sample are delivered through developer-managed land, this ambiguity and 
lack of commitment to enforcement creates risks. Compliance with on-site ecological mitigation and 
compensation measures in the UK is thought to be low (Drayson and Thompson, 2013), yielding 
concerns that long-term ecological management measures may be insufficiently implemented. Most 
importantly, the current reactive nature of English planning enforcement is poorly suited to 
guaranteeing the delivery of high-quality habitats within approved developments. Councils can only 
take action against known planning violations, with little financing currently available for routine 
monitoring. Failures of habitat types to reach specified condition levels are unlikely to be reported 
by the public (although Defra emphasise they would like a transparent system for monitoring 
implementation of the mandatory requirement (Defra, 2019a)). Furthermore, the logistical 
challenges of how to monitor and enforce whether habitats have reached their promised condition 
levels given that each development is associated with multiple habitats which each ‘mature’ over 
different timescales have not yet been addressed (although we expect accelerating discussions 
about implementation issues as the national policy rollout draws closer). Industry best-practice 
guidance alludes to this issue by recommending that project proponents produce BNG Management 
and Monitoring Plans which outline the long-term management and monitoring timetables for their 
development operations. These should include commitments to adaptive management if monitoring 
demonstrates that the compensatory habitats are not on track to meet their commitments, and 
potentially performance-based payment schedules (i.e. so ecological subcontractors would be paid 
only once given objectives were achieved; Baker et al. 2019). However, potential problems remain: 
the slowest-maturing habitats in the Metric are assumed to reach their desired condition levels 32 
years after project implementation, and assuming that councils will take enforcement action if those 
habitats fail to achieve their desired condition level decades after the project is constructed seems 
unrealistic. 
Compounding this, even when planning violations are reported, local government guidelines outline 
that councils are encouraged to only take enforcement action in the case of ‘serious harm to a local 
public amenity’ (House of Commons Library, 2019). The failure of a habitat to achieve the desired 
condition risks not satisfying this criterion, leaving them in essence unenforceable – identified as a 
key driver of failings of the Australian Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation 
(EPBC) Act and French NNL policy (Evans, 2017; Quétier et al., 2014; Samuel, 2020). Therefore, local 
authorities must rely on developers to implement the actions that are approved in their 
development applications; but if these actions include costly long-term management measures, they 
are implicitly incentivised to underinvest in ecological management with little or no oversight, risking 
long-term biodiversity outcomes. 
 
Lessons for reconciling infrastructure expansion and biodiversity conservation 
The mandatory BNG requirement will join a growing number of national NNL-type policies (zu 
Ermgassen et al., 2019b). The wide scope of development subject to mandatory BNG has the 
potential to make it a valuable template for other countries in the midst of international calls to 
change the functioning of our infrastructure systems in order to address ecological and climate 
emergencies (Thacker et al., 2019). However, this preliminary evaluation highlights that mandatory 
BNG as currently implemented at the local level risks poor outcomes for biodiversity when 
implemented nationally, unless key aspects receive additional attention. Many of these problems 
are paralleled by those in other biodiversity offsetting systems around the world (Table 1). 
 
 
Offsetting region Problem BNG susceptibility to problem 
– on-site 




Capacity shortfalls and 
inability to enforce lack of 
compliance (Evans, 2017; 
Quétier et al., 2014; Samuel, 
2020) 
High susceptibility. Planning 
enforcement system poorly 
suited to incentivising 
compliance, although 
significant investment 
committed to improving 
capacity. 




(contracts to protect private 
land designated for offset 
sites) expected to come with 
monitoring schedules and 
enforcement mechanisms. 
Queensland Inability to find appropriate 
projects to spend offset funds 
to generate biodiversity gains. 
Of the AUD$9.6 million paid 
into Queensland’s offset fund 
as of February 2019, only 
AUD$1.5 million had been 
committed or spent on offsets 
(Queensland Government, 
2019) 
- High susceptibility. 
Landholders often unwilling to 
commit to covenants, 
especially if there is policy 
uncertainty. 
France Failure to implement 
compensatory habitats 
(Bezombes et al., 2019) 
High susceptibility. Planning 
enforcement system poorly 
suited to incentivising 
compliance; compliance with 
ecological mitigation measures 
is in general imperfect 
(Drayson and Thompson, 
2013) 
Low susceptibility if all 
proposed governance 
measures implemented. 
Government has proposed an 
offset register, reporting 
annually. 
Western Australia Site-level condition 
assessments are inaccurate 
and cannot be replicated by 
independent evaluators 
(Thorn et al., 2018) 
High susceptibility. Expert 
survey shows information 
routinely provided in BNG 
assessments insufficient to 
eliminate judgement-based 
variation in condition 
assessments. 
High susceptibility. Expert 
survey shows information 
routinely provided in BNG 
assessments insufficient to 
eliminate judgement-based 




Power imbalances between 
regulators and developers 
allow developers to argue for 
cost-reductions to their 
proposed compensation 
measures (Carver and Sullivan, 
2017) 
Unknown susceptibility. Power 
imbalances were shown to 
influence the outcomes of 
biodiversity assessments for 
the offset pilots; mandatory 
BNG aims to address this by 
making biodiversity gains 
mandatory rather than 
negotiable. 
Unknown susceptibility. Power 
imbalances were shown to 
influence the outcomes of 
biodiversity assessments for 
the offset pilots; mandatory 
BNG aims to address this by 
making biodiversity gains 
mandatory rather than 
negotiable. 
Canada; globally Low offset multipliers are a 
key predictor of offset failure 
(Quigley and Harper, 2006; zu 
Ermgassen et al., 2019a) 
High susceptibility. BNG found 
to be delivering 34% loss of 
greenspace area, which if 
unaccompanied by significant 
improvements in vegetation 
condition post-development 
will lead to a loss of 
biodiversity. 
High susceptibility. BNG found 
to be delivering 34% loss of 
greenspace area, which if 
unaccompanied by significant 
improvements in vegetation 
condition post-development 
will lead to a loss of 
biodiversity. 
Table 1. Problems with compensatory mitigation systems around the world, and the degree to which proposed governance 
measures for the implementation of the mandatory BNG requirement address these problems 
 
 
Firstly, it is essential that the appropriate governance measures are in place if the policy is to 
continue to trade immediate biodiversity losses for uncertain future gains (Damiens et al. 2021); 
temporal multipliers cannot be relied upon alone (Bull et al., 2017). The governance of biodiversity 
units delivered through habitat banking and offsetting have received much attention. But if the 
majority of biodiversity units are likely to be delivered on site, current planning system mechanisms 
for monitoring and enforcing compliance are poorly suited for ensuring these materialise in reality.  
Secondly, although the responses to the government consultation found broad support from across 
stakeholders for the majority of biodiversity units being delivered on-site (Defra, 2019a), our study 
suggests this urgently deserves further debate. Our dataset is associated with a 34% loss in open 
greenspace, coupled with indications that the total level of funding generated through mandatory 
BNG for off-site, strategic investments in the Local Nature Recovery Networks may be small. 
Biodiversity enhancements delivered within development footprints risk not materialising in reality, 
because of governance issues, and these locations being subject to high levels of human pressure 
and disturbance. Therefore as currently implemented, mandatory BNG risks not only delivering little 
for biodiversity, but also missing a major opportunity to finance investments in regional biodiversity 
priorities that can help restore biodiversity at a landscape scale. These risks could be addressed by 
potentially incentivising the delivery of biodiversity off-site, such as through mandating that a 
certain percentage of the total biodiversity units delivered by a project must be invested in off-site 
regional biodiversity priorities or the Local Nature Recovery Network. Another mechanism might be 
capping how much urban land take is permitted by the policy. When the Metric was first designed, 
the authors recommended a 1:1 minimum area be established, so that a loss of habitat area could 
not solely be compensated for through promises of future condition increases (Treweek et al., 2010). 
On the other hand, a mandatory area target might disincentivise delivering higher condition 
habitats. It is also worth recognising that a key policy aim of mandatory BNG is improving peoples’ 
access to greenspace (Defra 2019b), which can be used to justify on-site biodiversity enhancements 
being prioritised. However, this priority risks overwhelming the biodiversity goals of the policy, and 
potential trade-offs should be explicitly discussed. 
Lastly, our study provides yet further evidence that designing governance mechanisms for 
reconciling infrastructure expansion with biodiversity conservation is deeply challenging. Even 
ambitious policies are subject to huge uncertainties that risk undermining their biodiversity benefits. 
The safest mechanism for reducing the biodiversity impact of infrastructure is to avoid impacts to 
biodiversity initially. In practice, this means redirecting development to previously degraded sites 
wherever possible. On a deeper level, given the need to transition to an economy that meets the 
needs of all within the constraints of the Earth system (O’Neill et al., 2018), we must rethink our bias 
towards finding environmentally-damaging hard infrastructural solutions to societal challenges. 
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